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#### The presumption of exclusive non-state terror that can be objectively studied is suspect – it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy constructed through speech and accumulation of data – invoking the threat is counterproductive

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As explained earlier, a ﬁrst order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and employing the same social scientiﬁc modes of analysis, terminology, and empirical and analytical categories employed within terrorism studies, as well as many of its own texts and authors, it can be argued that virtually all the narratives and assumptions described in the previous section are contestable and subject to doubt. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead sufﬁce to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives. In the ﬁrst instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instill terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial deﬁnition within the ﬁeld and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002). The assumption that terrorism can be objectively deﬁned and studied is also highly questionable and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identiﬁed in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the ﬁrst instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identiﬁable set of discursive practices – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security ofﬁcials, and the codiﬁcation of certain actions in law – which thus make it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement ofﬁcials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the deﬁnitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies ﬁeld. Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004). More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, speciﬁcally, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key ﬁndings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s ﬁndings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005). Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efﬁcacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006). In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the ﬁeld, Andrew Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the ﬁrst order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and ﬁnal ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, ﬁrst order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the ﬁeld, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects.

#### This manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

#### Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing the contradictions of imperial knowledge production – this dissident act fractures hegemonic thought

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30)

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

#### Every affirmation is a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – neutralizing that moment before a decision is in of itself violent

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

### Manufacturing

#### The affirmative’s economic nationalism makes possible the sacrifice of populations deemed impure

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It is doubtful whether neoconservatism represents a break from neoliberalism that is significant enough to distinguish the two perspectives within the power bloc. An intrinsic incompatibility is not expressed if, for example, the ideal of the (laissez-faire) state is conceptualized differently in Chicago School economic theory (in which the state's proper role is reduced to maintaining a rudimentary system of rules that can guarantee access to "free" markets) and Straussian political philosophy (which stresses the requirement of a nationally cohesive authoritarian state-led by a beneficial tyranny-that must establish a solid moral order and ensure the defense of Western civilization). The relationship between the two positions is revealing in that the chief intellectuals identified with the neocons (e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Kagan, and William Kristol), though they frequently disagree in public on matters of philosophy and policy, are united by their enthusiasm for neoliberal economics. Giving continuity to the U.S. ruling class is a belief in a neoliberal market standard of civilization and in the leading role of the U.S. in securing this standard of civilization, by force if necessary. The more brutal and coercive form of capitalist rule that is currently being reconfigured, then, is less concerned with liberal tropes of prosperity, representation, and freedom than with asserting a universal (neoliberal) market standard of civilization. Since the birth of the U.S. state, the central legitimating myth has been the assumption that the U.S. had adopted the mantle of the guardian of Western civilization. The genocides of indigenous populations that enabled European colonization of the Americas, particularly in North America, were committed with reference to a "chosen people" mythology derived from the Christian Bible. Central to this mythology is the idea that the U.S. inherited from the Europeans the guardianship of Western civilization. As Amin (2004: 63) notes, "thereafter, the United States extended to the whole planet its project of realizing the work that 'God' had commanded it to carry out." The chosen-people myth formed the basis of the Manifest Destiny doctrine; it was particularly influential in the post-World War II period, especially in George Kennan's writings. Recent neocon texts express this view, by contrasting the willingness with which the U.S. defends Western civilization with the spinelessness of "old" Europe (see Kagan, 2003). The core legitimating narrative for U.S. imperialism, then, is the claim that the U.S. is uniquely placed to guarantee peace and stability, and to provide leadership for the weak, backward, wayward rest of the world; this "chosen people" myth allows the U.S. to stake claims to global economic leadership and American exceptionalism (Said, 1993: 343-349). The program first set out by the neocon pressure group-the Project for the New American Century-has now been fully realized in Afghanistan and Iraq and has taken American exceptionalism to new heights. seeking to use a full complement of diplomatic, political, and military efforts to preserve and extend "an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles,"2 the program represents a profoundly nationalist stance that expresses U.S. preemptive strategy in terms derived from a "chosen people" myth. Legitimacy for U.S. global hegemony at this juncture is based upon a patriotism that reasserts the U.S. as the guardian of Western civilization. Two features of hegemonic rule, the economy and nationhood, characterize the political moment at the heart of the Imperium that is often "blamed" upon a neocon cabal. It is the neoliberal economic doctrine, wedded to a strengthening of patriotic allegiances to the United States. This moment of political leadership in the U.S. invokes loyalty to the nation-state as an explicit means of strengthening a particular form of market capitalism and uses the market to strengthen allegiance to particularly violent and authoritarian forms of state power. It seeks a commitment to supporting the coercive responses of national states and the uninterrupted progress of the global market as twin bulwarks against terrorists

#### No extinction from disease

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Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

The affirmative’s discourse of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”

Gomel, 2000(Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

#### Deterrence theory is wrong

Wilson 8 (Ward Wilson, senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons Project, November 2008, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” published in the *Nonproliferation Review* Volume 15 Number 3, <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153_wilson.pdf>) gz

Some people try to make the case for nuclear deterrence not by explaining its theoretical basis but by simply pointing to its track record. They assert that nuclear deterrence prevented nuclear attacks for the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 and claim that that is proof enough of its efficacy. There are problems with this, however. In order to answer the question, ‘‘did deterrence work?’’ you must first be able to know whether your opponent had a fully formed intention to attack and then refrained from doing so because of your threat. Questions of intention, particularly the intention of world leaders\*who are typically reluctant to admit being thwarted in almost any circumstances\***are rarely documented**, and when documentary evidence is present, **difficult to judge**. As George and Smoke note, ‘‘It is difficult . . . to identify cases of deterrence success reliably in the absence of better data on the policy calculations of potential initiators who were presumably deterred. Instances of apparently successful deterrence . . . may be spurious.’’ 39 There are also **a number of other plausible explanations** for the absence of war during this period. Most major wars are followed by periods, sometimes quite long periods, of relative peace. The hundred years following the Napoleonic wars were for the most part ones of peace in Europe. The period following the Thirty Years War also was strikingly pacific. Why does it make sense to attribute the peace following the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic Wars to ‘‘war weariness,’’ ‘‘economic exhaustion,’’ or ‘‘domestic political distraction,’’ but the peace after World War II to nuclear deterrence? Consider, for example, the case of chemical weapons following World War I. The conditions necessary for deterrence with these weapons of mass destruction were present. In the early 1920s, Germany, England, France, Italy, Russia, the United States, and others possessed the means necessary (industrial capacity to mass produce the chemical agents, bombers with sufficient range and carrying capacity, naval ships capable of firing large shells over long ranges) to use chemical weapons against the densely populated coastal and interior urban centers of their enemies.40 Such attacks, properly planned and executed, could have killed hundreds of thousands. They would certainly have ranked on a par with the most deadly city attacks in World War II. Yet no standard histories of the post-World War I era ascribe the peace that was maintained during those years to a ‘‘delicate balance’’ of deadly weapons of mass destruction. We do not rush to give deterrence the credit for the peace of those years. If nuclear weapons are seen as preventing war from 1950 to 1980, why is it that chemical weapons are not seen as having prevented war for the seven years from 1918 to 1925?41 Locating the reason why an action or phenomenon did not occur, finding the cause of an absence, is **always problematic**. For example, I believe firmly that the garlic I wear around my neck has prevented vampire attacks. The proof, I say, is that no vampires have, as yet, attacked me. Yet objective observers might still be skeptical. The problem with the claim about deterrence is that although there were contingency plans on both sides, there is **little evidence** that either the United States or the Soviet Union was ever on the brink of launching an aggressive war against the other. There is **certainly no evidence** of such an action that was planned, agreed to, and then thwarted by the threat of nuclear counterattack.42 How is it possible to assert that deterrence prevented war without clear evidence that war was ever imminent? It might be argued that while there is no particular war that was abandoned because of deterrence, deterrence did engender a general mutual restraint both in normal diplomatic relations and during the numerous crises of the Cold War. It is true that the large nuclear arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union induced caution during this period. Numerous memoirs of leaders on both sides attest to this fact. But this is **not evidence** that deterrence worked. The mutual caution of the Cold War is evidence that nuclear weapons are dangerous, not that they are effective weapons of war or useful for threatening. To understand this, imagine a counterfactual involving biological weapons. No one argues that biological weapons are ideal weapons. They are blunt instruments, clumsy and difficult to employ effectively. Targeting with precision is a particular problem, as the wind has an unfortunate tendency to blow in unexpected directions, and the biological agents can, under certain circumstances, blow back on your own troops or population. No one argues that biological weapons are decisive weapons of war, crucial for security. They argue instead that biological weapons are dangerous, clumsy weapons that are best banned. Imagine, however, that following World War II the United States and Soviet Union had been armed with large arsenals of biological weapons mounted on missiles kept on hair-trigger alert. Is it difficult to believe that such arsenals would have induced caution on both sides? Yet we would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons were any less clumsy, difficult to aim, or difficult to control. We would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons are actually more militarily effective than we had previously thought. In the same way, nuclear weapons are dangerous (and induce caution) without being particularly effective. The caution on both sides during the Cold War is not proof of the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Although the successes of nuclear deterrence over the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 are speculative, its failures are not. Despite expectations to the contrary, the U.S. nuclear monopoly in the four years after World War II **did not yield significantly greater diplomatic influence**.43 Far from being cowed, the Soviets were very tough in post-war negotiations, culminating in the 1948 showdown over access to Berlin. Nuclear weapons also failed to give their possessors a decisive military advantage in war. The United States was fought to a draw in Korea and subsequently lost a war fought in Vietnam, despite possessing the ‘‘ultimate weapon.’’ The Soviet Union found that its nuclear arsenal could not prevent failure in its own guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Since Vietnam, the United States has fought in the **Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq**.44 In none of these wars were its opponents intimidated into surrendering, nor could a practical use for nuclear weapons be devised. Against these failures are often offered a range of explanations. The enemy had an ally who possessed nuclear weapons, the war was not sufficiently central to the interests of the nuclear power to justify using weapons of last resort, and so on. These explanations, however, cannot account for the striking failure of deterrence in both the Yom Kippur War and the Falkland Islands War. Twice, during the Cold War, countries that had nuclear weapons were attacked\*were made war on\*by nations that did not have nuclear weapons. In both cases the threat of a nuclear retaliation **failed to deter**. How can these failures be accounted for? One of the benefits of deterrence is that it is supposed to protect against conventional assault. Yet in both these cases nuclear weapons failed to provide this protection. The case of Israel is particularly striking. Given the deep animus between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria, on the other, the repeated statements by various Arab spokesmen that Israel had no right to exist, and the resulting probability that Israel would interpret any attack as a threat to its very existence, the danger of a nuclear attack by Israel would seem to be far greater than in any instance of Cold War confrontation. Yet **nuclear weapons failed Israel**. **They did not deter**. In fact, they failed twice: neither Anwar Sadat, the leader of Egypt, nor Hafez al-Assad, the leader of Syria, was deterred.45 There is positive evidence that nuclear threats do not prevent conventional attacks, **even in circumstances where nuclear deterrence ought to work robustly** (extermination a possibility, implacable foes). Similarly the evidence provides little support for the notion that nuclear weapons provide diplomatic leverage. The only use for nuclear deterrence with no clear-cut failures (thankfully) is the claim that nuclear deterrence wards off nuclear attacks. Although the practical record does not indict this form of deterrence, the general theoretical objections to it still apply.

#### Peace through strength is the ultimate justification for violence—their rhetoric of deterrence blurs the line between war and peace making destruction inevitable

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Of course the U.S. would still be at war, but it would be cold war. By this logic, the nation could be at peace while waging cold war indefinitely, which meant that it could pursue world peace while building up an immense nuclear arsenal. Indeed his strategy and discourse made hopes for peace depend on continuing cold war and a continuing buildup of nuclear weapons. He expected to manage all apocalyptic threats by threatening to use weapons of apocalypse. Eisenhower's language obliterated the difference between war and peace. War became the way to peace. But the word "peace" also became a weapon of cold war. To make his strategy work, Eisenhower had to calm quite reasonable fears among U.S. allies that more nuclear weapons meant more chance of war. He was convinced that the United States had to have staunch allies to wage cold war successfully. Behind this conviction lay perhaps his greatest fear: that the rest of the world would fall under communist domination, leaving the U.S. "an island of freedom in a hostile sea of communism." In that case, he told his National Security Council (NSC), the U.S. would have no choice but to launch an all-out war against the Soviet Union. To avoid such a catastrophe, Eisenhower wanted desperately to hold the allegiance of his strongest allies.But, as John Foster Dulles advised the NSC, "talk of atomic attack tended to create `peace-at-any-price' people and might lead to an increase of appeasement sentiment in various countries. The Russians are smarter on this question because they never talk about using atomic weapons." Eisenhower agreed: "Everybody seems to think that we're skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers. We ought not to miss any chance to make clear our peaceful objectives."

#### Acts of sovereign violence due to the normalization of the state of emergency have made hegemony impossible forever for the United States—any exercise of US force in the future is only domination without hegemony that is doomed to fail

Gulli, 13 Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: **The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy** on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they **rest on violence and terror**, or the threat thereof. This is an **obvious and essential aspect** of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by **the lack of hegemony**. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, **the United States**, whose hegemony has **diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the **sheer drive for domination** has to show **its true face**, its **raw violence**. The usual, traditional **ideological justifications for dominance** (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become **very weak** because of **the contempt** that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) **regularly show** toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the **I**nternational **C**riminal **C**ourt, remains a clear limit, a possibility. **Not so for the dominant nations**: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their **structural, ontological and historical, weakness**. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) **only heighten the brutality** in the exertion of **what remains of their dominance**. Although they rely on a **highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has **traditionally** been and **increasingly** is an outpost for **military operations and global policing** (now excellently **incarnated by Africom**), **they know that they have lost their hegemony**.

‘**Domination without hegemony’** is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future” (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of **the bifurcation of financial and military power.** Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered **what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.”** He continues:

Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of **‘domination without hegemony’** (1994/2010: 384). What can the US do next? **Not much, short of brutal dominance**. In the last few years, we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill **all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony**. In fact, this killing, just like G. W. Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a **Mafia-style** regolamento di conti more than any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have **correctly compared** to **that of** 17-year-old Trayvon Martin (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in cases like this one that **the weakness at the heart of empire**, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled **fury for the loss of hegemony**, becomes visible. The frenzy denies the possibility of **power as care**, which is **what should replace hegemony**, let alone domination. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. What is needed is rather **a radical alternative** in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, **a poetic rather than military and financial shift.**

#### Their impacts rely on the concept of the homo calculan – this creates a sadistic necro-economy that makes their impacts inevitable and turns us into slaves

Bifo 11 (Franco Berardi is an is Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism, After the Future , 09/20/11, <http://www.sok.bz/web/media/video/AfterFuture.pdf>, [JJ])

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality.¶ Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the¶ problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went¶ wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the¶ Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economists¶ the central dogma of growth, profit and competition cannot be questioned,¶ because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market.¶ And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic¶ theology of neoliberalism.¶ But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is¶ an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed¶ to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and¶ perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social¶ action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the¶ conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an¶ attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault¶ (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The¶ Birth of Biopolitics.¶ This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced¶ cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon¶ flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation is not¶ perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective¶ reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal¶ spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we¶ confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof¶ and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s¶ assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof¶ and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is¶ not radical enough, and does not touch the legitimacy of the economic¶ episteme.¶ Animal Spirits is the title of an other book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008).¶ Pasquinelli’s book deals with bodies and digits, and parasites, and goes much¶ deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its eponymous¶ publication: “Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it¶ subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential” (Pasquinelli¶ 2008: 93). “Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers¶ experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their¶ everyday life” (Pasquinelli 2008: 15).¶ Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social¶ production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the¶ prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living¶ energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of¶ financial craziness, but also the effect of the de-vitalization of the social field.¶ This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of¶ economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in the last two¶ centuries.¶ Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis¶ of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I mean the¶ psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire¶ and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that¶ the answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. ¶ Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word¶ “science” means the creation of concepts for the understanding and¶ description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object does not exist.¶ The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object that¶ exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme.¶ Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic¶ discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls¶ under the domination of capitalist rule.¶ The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic¶ description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a¶ technique, a process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a¶ narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: ¶ Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and¶ perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything¶ within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the¶ Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows¶ itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value,¶ bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity,¶ demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to¶ behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do¶ tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold¶ the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of¶ psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks,¶ investments and losses. (Sordello 1983)¶ From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a¶ process of production of scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were¶ intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people¶ who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to¶ become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on¶ the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique¶ of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human¶ beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented¶ activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time¶ itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and¶ body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth¶ is making scarce both water and air.¶ Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of¶ producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx¶ did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of¶ economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies¶ richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to¶ the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried¶ work. ¶ In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very¶ foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of¶ material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the¶ Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic¶ categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. ¶ The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of¶ John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be¶ privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple.¶ But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without¶ cost? Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process,¶ the economic nomos of private property loses its ground, its raison d’etre, and¶ it can be imposed only by force. Furthermore, the very foundation of salary,¶ the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product,¶ is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it¶ almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time¶ and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able¶ to determine price and salary.¶ The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide¶ deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational¶ expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a selfregulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a¶ lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global¶ capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund¶ and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of¶ the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the¶ market is militarily regulated.¶ The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect¶ knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect¶ rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has¶ finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The¶ theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic¶ agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best¶ deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies¶ has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the¶ theoretical swindle. ¶ Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because irrational¶ factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading¶ information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional¶ tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. ¶ The idea that social relationships can be described in mathematical terms has¶ the force of myth, but it is not science, and it has nothing to do with natural¶ law. Notwithstanding the failure of the theory, neoliberal politics are still in¶ control of the global machine, because the criminal class that has seized power¶ has no intention of stepping down, and because the social brain is unable to¶ recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New York Times¶ on September 6th 2009:¶ After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks¶ began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may¶ have found one. The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” life insurance¶ policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life¶ expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these policies,¶ in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds.¶ They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will¶ receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. The earlier the¶ policyholder dies, the bigger the return, though if people live longer than¶ expected investors could get poor returns or even lose money.¶ Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would¶ absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so I’ll pay¶ the fee for a long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I¶ 113die. But some enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the¶ insurer. He buys the risk, and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You don’t¶ need the imagination of Philip K. Dick to guess the follow up of the story:¶ financial agents will be motivated to kill me overnight. ¶ The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. It’s not¶ new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides.¶ But now the equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the¶ investment and the hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure.¶ The logic of speculation is different from the logic of spectacle that was¶ dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle is the mirrorization of life, the¶ transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation. Speculation is the¶ subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of present life¶ with future money that will never come, because death will come before.¶ The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad:¶ neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their¶ speculation, and corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political¶ class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to¶ protect society from the final assault.¶ In 1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: “the most perfect crime of all – when¶ the victims are either willing, or aren’t aware that they are victims”.¶ Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of¶ the economy, because the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of¶ political opinion, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The¶ economy has been declared the basic standard of decision, and the economists¶ have systematically identified Economy with the capitalist obsession of¶ growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the corporate principles¶ have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and imagination.

### Terror

#### No border terror – it’s hype, status quo solves, they come legally or through Canada

McCombs 11 (Brady, Correspondent – Arizona Daily Star, Citing Edward Alden, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, Arizona Daily Star, 6-7, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article\_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html)

A turning political tide has renewed fears that raged after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks - that terrorists will sneak into the country across the U.S.-Mexico border. Nobody disputes that's possible, but analysts and government officials say terrorists plotting to kill Americans are more likely to use **other routes** into the country, if they're not **here already**. It's much more common for people convicted in the U.S. of crimes connected to international terrorism to have been **U.S. citizens** or legal residents, or come into the country on visas. "There is **no** serious **evidence** that the U.S.-Mexico border is a significant threat from terrorism," said Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank based in New York. Claims of terrorist threats on the Southwest border distract legislators and policymakers from addressing long-term solutions to drug smuggling and illegal immigration, said Tom Barry, senior analyst at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "It's **politically motivated**," Barry said, "playing on that sense of **fear** that certain people are susceptible to." But proponents of tougher border enforcement say protecting Americans against terrorism motivates them, not politics. "There's an enormous risk," said Michael Braun, who retired as chief of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008. Members of Hezbollah, for example, "are absolute masters at identifying existing smuggling infrastructures on many borders around the world where they operate." The State Department's 2009 "Country Reports on Terrorism" found that "**no** known international terrorist organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and **no terrorist incidents** targeting U.S. interests and personnel occurred on or originated from Mexican territory." The State Department said that there was **no evidence** of ties between Mexican organized crime and international terrorist groups. But it warns: "The violence attributed to organized-crime groups on the border, however, continued to strain Mexico's law-enforcement capacities, creating potential vulnerabilities that terrorists seeking access to the United States could exploit." Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu emphasized the risk of terrorists crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. in a May 26 open letter to President Obama. "If the majority of regular illegal immigrants can sneak into America, what does this say about the ability of terrorist sleeper cells?" Babeu wrote. "The porous U.S.-Mexican border is the gravest national-security threat facing America." Hiding in a car trunk In his letter to the president, Babeu said thousands of illegal immigrants hailing from "special-interest countries" make the U.S.-Mexico border a national-security threat. "In some cases, we have confirmed their troubling ties to terrorism," Babeu wrote. "Yet for those we apprehend, how many today live amongst us?" The Border Patrol apprehended an average of 339 people from "special-interest countries" - those that warrant special handling based on terrorism risk factors - at the U.S.-Mexico border each year over the past six years, Homeland Security data show. That's less than 1 percent each year of the total apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border, Homeland Security figures show. **None** of the 2,039 people arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border in that span presented a credible terrorist threat, Homeland Security officials say. Homeland Security monitors, analyzes and **gathers intelligence** about potential threats but at this time "does not have **any credible information** on terrorist groups operating along the Southwest border," said department spokesman Matt Chandler. Among the 36 people convicted by the U.S. Justice Department of charges relating to international terrorism last year, none came into the United States from Mexico. Half were U.S. citizens, most of them naturalized from countries such as Sudan or Somalia. Seven were extradited from other countries, while three were captured abroad by American forces. The others came to the United States on visas, or, in one case, were arrested while trying to come into the United States legally at a port of entry on the Canadian border. However, over the last decade there have been a handful of cases in which suspected terrorists or Muslim extremists crossed the Mexican border illegally. None led to attempted terrorist attacks in the United States. In 2001, for example, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani rode into the United States in the trunk of a car coming from Tijuana. He went on to live in Dearborn, Mich., but was arrested in 2003, and in 2005 was convicted of conspiring to send money to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In January of this year, an extremist imam from Tunisia, Said Jaziri, was arrested while riding in the trunk of a car on a highway east of San Diego. Jaziri, who was expelled from Canada in 2007, hiked across the Mexican border with another illegal immigrant, and both were picked up by an American driver. But a firefighter saw them pile into the trunk and reported them to Border Patrol agents, who pulled the car over and found the men. Jaziri was charged with a misdemeanor immigration violation. not A traditional route Over the last two decades, almost **all** of the known international terrorists arrested in the United States have come on **legal visas** or were allowed to come in without a visa, said Alden, of the Council on Foreign Relations. "These are people that come on airplanes," said Alden, author of "The Closing of the American Border," which explains how the U.S. revised visa and border policies in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The 19 people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks entered the country on legal visas. And over the last four to five years, the terrorist plots have increasingly involved people already in the United States - citizens and legal residents, he said. "The notion of the (Southwest) border as the line that protects us from terrorism has really gone out of the window in the last several years," Alden said. Not only is the U.S. side of the border **heavily guarded**, but the Mexican government makes an **extraordinary effort** to prevent terrorists from coming through its country. For instance, Mexico **shares** real-time **information** with the U.S. about airline passengers arriving in Mexico to make sure they don't include potential terrorists, Alden said. The Mexican drug-smuggling organizations have **no interest** in allowing smuggling routes to be used by terrorist organizations either, he said. "If it is discovered that a terrorist that carried out an attack in the United States came across the Mexican border, then the response would be further fortification of that border that shuts down smuggling routes and cuts into the profits," he said. Being associated with terrorist groups would be **very bad** for business for drug-smuggling organizations, said Sylvia Longmire, a drug-war analyst and author. Proof of a terrorist coming through Mexico would have dire consequences for the Mexican government, too, she said. But that point of view ignores the fact that terrorist groups and Latin American drug smugglers sometimes do business with each other and therefore have connections, said Braun, the former DEA operations chief, who now runs a security-consulting firm, Spectre Group International. "Hezbollah is now heavily involved in the global cocaine trade," Braun said. "Most of the cocaine they're involved in distributing is heading toward Europe, but they're affiliating with the same cartels sending drugs to the United States." That isn't to say the groups share an ideology, but simply that they have the connections needed to exploit smuggling routes into the United States. Also, people from the Middle East tend to have dark hair, dark eyes and olive skin, like most Latin Americans, so they can easily blend in, he said. "On a moonless night at two in the morning, there's not a lot of due diligence going on when the coyotes and gatekeepers are moving human traffic across that border," Braun said. Canada is a **more likely** crossing point because that country allows in more people as refugees and asylum seekers, said Henry Willis, a senior policy researcher on homeland security at the Rand Corp. "To regard the Southwestern border as the 'frontline against terrorism,' as the Border Patrol does, is folly," wrote Barry, of the Center for International Policy, in a recent report.

#### No Al-Qaeda threat – attacks fail and ideology dead

**Bergen 12** (Peter Bergen, CNN national security analyst, is the author of "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden, From 9/11 to Abbottabad.", 6/6/2012, "And now, only one senior al Qaeda leader left", edition.cnn.com/2012/06/05/opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-whos-left/index.html)

Washington (CNN) -- The news that Abu Yahya al-Libi, the No.2 leader of al Qaeda, is now confirmed to have been killed in a CIA drone strike in Pakistan's tribal region along the border with Afghanistan further underlines that the terrorist group that launched the 9/11 attacks is now more or less out of business. Under President Barack Obama, CIA drone strikes have killed 15 of the most important players in al Qaeda, according to a count maintained by the New America Foundation (a nonpartisan think tank where I am a director). Similarly, President George W. Bush also authorized drone strikes that killed 16 important al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan while he was in office. As a result, according to senior U.S. counterterrorism officials, there now remains only one leader of any consequence in al Qaeda and that is Ayman al-Zawahiri, the tetchy Egyptian surgeon who became the head of the group following the death of its founder, Osama bin Laden, in a U.S. Navy SEAL raid in Pakistan in May 2011. Zawahiri, presumably, is keenly aware of the fate of so many of his longtime colleagues in al Qaeda. He will be expending considerable energy not to end up on the business end of a missile fired by a CIA drone if he, too, is hiding in the Pakistani tribal regions where the drone strikes have been concentrated. Meanwhile, Zawahiri faces an almost impossible task to follow through on al Qaeda's main mission: attacking the United States, or failing that, one of its close allies. Al Qaeda hasn't conducted a successful attack in the West since the bombings on London's transportation system on July 7, 2005, and of course, the group hasn't succeeded in attacking the United States for more than a decade. There are, however, al Qaeda's regional affiliates still to contend with. The most virulent of those is the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. It was AQAP that tried to bring down Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 using a Nigerian recruit who had secreted a hard-to-detect bomb in his underwear, and it was AQAP that smuggled bombs in printer cartridges onto cargo planes bound for the U.S. in October 2010. Last month came news that a spy had penetrated AQAP and had retrieved a new generation of underwear bomb that the group's bomb maker had apparently recently designed to bring down a commercial jet. But all of AQAP's plots to bring down planes have had one thing in common: They failed. Some might say that that while al Qaeda the organization may be basically dead, its ideology continues to thrive and to inspire "lone wolves" to attack the United States. In fact, lone wolves inspired by jihadist ideology have managed to kill a total of 17 Americans in the United States since 9/11, according to a tally maintained by the New America Foundation. Meanwhile, 54 Americans are reported to be killed every year by lightning, according to the National Weather Service. In other words, to the average American, lightning is about 30 times more deadly than jihadist terrorism. Few Americans harbor irrational fears about being killed by a lightning bolt. Abu Yahya al-Libi's death on Monday should remind them that fear of al Qaeda in its present state is even more irrational.

#### No risk of bioterror

Mueller 99, John Mueller, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State and Karl Mueller, June, ’99 (Foreign Affairs, l/n)

Biological weapons seem a promising candidate to join nuclear ones in the WMD club because, properly developed and deployed, they might indeed kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical, however, because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used, even though knowledge of their destructive potential goes back centuries. (The English, for example, made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians during the French and Indian War.) Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason, because biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and control. Although terrorist groups or rogue states may overcome such problems in the future through advances in knowledge and technology, the record thus far is not likely to encourage them. Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures may have killed thousands of Chinese but apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and had little military impact. In the 1990s the large and extremely well funded Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo apparently tried at least nine times to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops. these efforts failed to cause a single fatality -- in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place. For best results biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds, which is very difficult to do. Explosive methods of dispersion, moreover, may destroy the organisms. And except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult; even if refrigerated, most have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons are gradual, very hard to predict, and could spread back onto the attacker, and they can be countered with civil defense measures.

Disease defense takes out terminal impact

#### No scenario for nuclear terror – consensus of experts

Fay 13 – PhD student in the history department at Temple University, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, (Matt, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, 7/18/13 webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a)

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But **beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack** really? While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and **argued against the prevailing alarmism**. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John **Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism** in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place. But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use. Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis. The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: **states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists**. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude: [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence. From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—**nuclear terrorism hardly warrants** the type of exertions many **alarmist assessments** indicate it should.

#### Ayson concedes low probability of escalation – we wouldn’t blame other countries

Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington

(Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. **It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves.** For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

## 2NC

### framework

#### A. Ontology shapes politics

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

B. Representations and the affective field of images are the basis and motivation for war. What we lack is not a proper scientific or empirical challenge to violence; we lack the cultural critics willing to fight the fear mongering which results in war. The AFF’s discourse is enmeshed in a form of affective securitization that makes war inevitable. As scholars, we have an obligation to refuse and problematize the cultural grammar of security.

Elliott 2012

/Emory, University Professor of the University of California and Distinguished Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside Terror, Theory, and the Humanities ed. Di Leo, Open Humanities Press, Online/

In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II: In a repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society that’s ﬁlled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to. (qtd. in DePietro 84) The implications of DeLillo’s statement are that we are all engaged in national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere. In the early days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images, such as those of the “mother of all bombs” and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruction, scandals and illegalities, and domestic and international demonstrations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction of this agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as critical readers of political and social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed texts, are needed now more urgently than ever to analyze the relationships between political power and the wide range of rhetorical methods being employed by politicians and others to further their destructive effects in the world. If humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aesthetic devices such as we see in those photos achieve their affective appeal, citizens may begin to understand how they are being manipulated and motivated by emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our ability to expose some of these verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable discussion, we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to result from cultural differences and failures of communication than from inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward polarized thinking and opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist religious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world, leaders continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions. Most government leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the problems we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human issues. That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to influence and perhaps even alter the current course of events. In spite of the discouragements that we as scholars of the humanities are experiencing in these times, it seems to me that we have no option but to continue to pursue our research and our teaching and hope to influence others to question the meaning and motives of what they see and hear.

#### C. They cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### AT: sim

Simulation is bad and results in powerlessness

Antonio 95 (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

### A2 perm

The permutation is a teleological knee jerk which blocks out critique

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

### [link debate]

Muslim Otherization creates a dyad between faiths, making genocidal violence inevitable

Batur, 2k7 (Pinar Batur, Professor of Sociology and Director of Environmental Studies at Vassar College; “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” 2007, “Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations,” “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide”)

Albert Memmi argued that “We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what happened as a result of it”(Memmi, 1965: 114). Events surrounding Iraq and Katrina provide three critical points regarding global racism. The first one is that segregation, exclusion, and genocide are closely related and facilitated by institutions employing the white racial frame to legitimize their ideologies and actions. The second one is the continuation of violence, either sporadically or systematically, with single- minded determination from segregation, to exclusion, to genocide. The third point is that legitimization and justification of violence is embedded in the resignation that global racism will not alter its course, and there is no way to challenge global racism. Together these three points facilitate the base for war and genocide In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics” (Huntington 1993: 22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntington’s end of ideology meant the West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic “other.” Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the “Confucian-Islamic” civilizations, by exploiting the conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with September 11. The new color line means “we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what they believe in.”

## 1NR

## Critique

### Util

#### Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

## Manufacuring

### Disease

#### Prefer our ev-public health authorities have an incentive to massively exaggerate pandemic scenarios

Michael **Fitzpatrick**, General Practitioner @ Barton House Health Center, November 20**10**. “Pandemic Flu: Public Health and the Culture of Fear”

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/NTS/resources/research\_papers/NTS%20Working%20Paper2.pdf

Projections by leading public health officials of rates of disease and death from pandemic flu on a catastrophic scale had a major impact. While WHO experts such as Keiji Fukuda speculated that global death rates would be in the millions, if not tens of millions, television reports featured images of the 1918-19 pandemic and accounts of the devastating effects of that (historically unprecedented) viral pestilence.10 Patients fearful for their own healtn and that of their children, their elderly relatives, and family members with chronic illnesses sought medical advice and whatever preventative measures were available. There is however little evidence that raising awareness of the emerging threat of swine flu had any protective value. Given the rapid spread of the virus, it appears than none of the measures taken in the early 'containment' phase of the outbreak, such as more assiduous hand-washing, face masks, social distancing measures (school closures, etc.) and the provision of prophylactic antivirals to contacts had an appreciable effect on its spread. Pregnant women, deemed to be particularly at risk, were particularly susceptible to pandemic fears - and their anxieties were subsequently compounded by the development of vaccines that rival scaremongers claimed were unsafe. It soon emerged that early reports from Mexico provided unreliable figures for deaths resulting from swine flu and an uncertain number of cases of infection to use as a denominator with which to calculate the mortality rate. As it also became clear that most cases were mild, projections for the impact of the pandemic were steadily scaled down." In July, British authorities anticipated that 30 per cent of the population (19 million people) would become infected, with a complication rate of 15 per cent, a hospitalisation rate of 2 per cent and a death rate between 0.1 per cent and 0.35 per cent (between 19,000 and 65,000 people). By September the figure of 19,000 had become the worst-case scenario; the following month this was reduced to 1,000. In December, the official report on the mortality statistics for the first six months of the pandemic in England estimated a mortality rate of 0.026 per cent (138 confirmed deaths, and cases of swine flu in 1 per cent of the population), a rate substantially lower than the most optimistic scenario of six months earlier.12 The contrast with earlier influenza pandemics was dramatic: the death rate in 1918-19 was 2-3 per cent, and that in the less severe pandemics of 1957-58 and 1967-68 around 0.2 per cent. In the judgement of the Hine Report, ministers and officials placed excessive faith in mathematical modelling. They had come to regard this as 'hard, quantitative science' that could provide 'easily understandable figures' which had the aura of appearing 'scientifically very robust'.13 Though the mathematicians had warned, at the first pandemic planning meeting in April, that in the absence of reliable data their modelling capability was low, they were under pressure from the politicians to 'produce forecasts'. The high level of uncertainty surrounding these projections does not seem to have deterred the modellers from producing them or the politicians from projecting them into the public realm. The Hine Report observes that by the end of the first wave of swine flu cases in September, sufficient data were available to guarantee accurate modelling of the second wave. However, official statements still sought to warn against complacency about future dangers and did nothing to allay the anxieties provoked by earlier doomsday scenarios. The Hine Report is critical of the public promotion of 'reasonable worst-case scenarios', which imply 'a reasonably likely event', focusing in particular on CMO Professor Liam Donaldson's July statement. The report says: The English CMO's citing of the 'reasonable worst-case' planning assumption of 65,000 fatalities on 16 July 2009 was widely reported in headlines in somewhat alarmist terms.14 It seems unfair to blame the media for the alarmist tone of their reports, when it was echoed by the newly appointed health minister Andy Bumham, who told parliament that the swine flu pandemic could no longer be controlled and that there could be 100,000 cases a day by the end of August. It is striking that British authorities chose to promote such gloomy projections at a time when other prominent health figures had already declared such figures improbable. A month earlier, on the occasion of declaring the swine flu outbreak a global pandemic, WHO chief Margaret Chan had already recognised that most cases were mild and that she did not expect to see a sudden and dramatic jump in severe or fatal infections.15 While the Hine Report is generally highly congratulatory of the UK response to the swine flu pandemic, it suggests that the authorities may have adhered too strictly to the contingency plan they had developed over the previous decade to cope with the emergence of an influenza pandemic on the scale of the 1918-19 outbreak. As a result they 'did not consider sufficiently the possibility that a pandemic might be far less severe' than the one envisioned in that contingency plan. Their response was 'tailored to the plan, not the nature of the virus' and thus lacked flexibility. The report tentatively suggests that the authorities might consider as an alternative approach, a policy of preparing for the most likely outcome, while being prepared to monitor and change tack as necessary. The alarmist response to the swine flu outbreak reflects the wider trend of the past decade in which 'crying wolf has emerged as the appropriate official response to diverse real and imaginary threats, from the millennium bug to bioterrorism, obesity to global warming.'5 For the authorities, the over-riding principle is to avoid blame for unforeseen disasters, by always proclaiming the worst-case scenario and repeating the mantra 'prepare for the worst, hope for the best'. From this perspective, rational contingency planning gives way to scaremongering. Instead of making discreet preparations for probable, predictable emergencies (snow in winter, drought in summer), the authorities engage in speculation about the grimmest possible eventualities (massive loss of life resulting from disease or climate change) with the aim of promoting more responsible behaviour and healthier lifestyles.17 Rather than communicating realistic assessments of risk to the public, the authorities engage in sharing their anxieties and promoting fears. Instead of guiding practical professional interventions in response to real social problems, politicians and public health officials engage in dramatic posturing.

### Cuomo

#### **The affirmative’s view of “war as event” ensures militarization of society will consume the planet**

Cuomo 96 – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

### Jalbert

#### The concept of benign US dominance is whitewashing of brutal imperial violence and coercive social Darwinism

Jalbert 13 (Elie Jalbert, BA honors in anthropology at Concordia University, “Emergency as Security: Liberal Empire at Home and Abroad,” pp 31-2) gz

U.S. history is fraught with contradiction. There seems to have¶ been a persistent divide between its represented self-image and its¶ actions in the world. It has viewed itself as a land of the free,¶ where individuals have free reign to maximize their wealth and¶ pursue happiness without the constraints of government inhibiting¶ their freedom, while ignoring the way in which government typically¶ enforced the rights of one group over another (McCaull, 1976)¶ and provided the infrastructure and investments that made development¶ possible (Novak, 2008; Limerick, 2012). It has promoted its¶ exceptional nature and asserted its difference from all previous¶ empires, advocating fundamental human rights and opportunity¶ for all, though its society has been one of profound segregation¶ (Perlstein, 2006), with a foreign policy more often than not brutal,¶ repressive, and indeed essentially imperialistic (Chomsky, 1998;¶ McCoy, 2009)—a foreign policy that then in turn transformed domestic¶ policy by importing its policing practices back home (McCoy¶ & Scarano, 2009; Chomsky, 1999; De Genova, 2010; Steinmetz,¶ 2005, pp. 357–361). Founded on the genocide of its Indigenous¶ population, the U.S. has defined its brave and free persona by glorifying¶ its revolution that shook off the empire’s grip, yet has been¶ leading a global counterinsurgent “War on Terrorism” that defines¶ resistance as a threat that must be eliminated.¶ One such contradiction—the contrast of a projected benign history¶ of the quest for freedom and rights with the reality of American¶ ascent to global domination—is discussed by Novak (2008). In¶ addressing what he calls the “myth of the ‘weak’ American state”,¶ he shows how there is “an almost pathological tendency to confuse¶ American ideal with historical political reality,” and a constant¶ tension between “liberty and power, freedom and authority, contract¶ and coercion, and law and violence” (Novak, 2008, p. 754). In¶ the author’s view, the myth of an American weak state has its¶ roots in an exceptionalist view of the U.S as being a new world exempted¶ from previous political histories by a “so-called ‘natural’¶ development of individualism, private rights, civil society, free labour,¶ and a free economy” (Novak, 2008, pp. 754–755). McCaull¶ (1976) considers this sense of exceptionalism to be underpinned by¶ a Spencerian theory of social evolution that presents American industry¶ as the pinnacle of man’s ever ascending rise to perfection.¶ This “social Darwinism” that applied biological notions of survival¶ of the fittest to human society provided legitimacy for rapacious¶ and competitive social and economic practices by presenting them¶ as a natural and normal continuation of evolution toward complexity.¶ Spencer’s theory was thus co-opted by American industrialists¶ as a powerful “scientific” tool of laissez faire capitalism legitimation,¶ reminiscent of the Malthusian arguments discussed earlier,¶ that rooted their reasoning in the laws of nature so as to give them¶ an air of inevitability.

### No Border Terror

#### No border terrorism

Powell 11– Houston Chronicle writer(Stewart M., “Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas From Mexico?”, 12/2/11; < http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-Texas-from-2341185.php>)

Pakistani officials told Texas' Republican Congressman Michael McCaul on a recent visit to Karachi that potential operatives from Pakistan, Iran, al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Haqqani network can obtain visas for Mexico from Mexican diplomatic outposts in Pakistan far more easily than getting them for the United States, making Mexico a perfect way station. Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - experts say such Iranian-financed factions are not crossing the southwest border. They point instead to the 327 airports and border crossings in the United States where legitimate or forged passports might be used the same way that 19 hijackers gained access to carry out the 9/11 attacks. "The last thing these organizations want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention," says James Carafano, a West Point graduate and retired Army lieutenant colonel handling security affairs at the Heritage Foundation. "They want to be as unobtrusive as possible." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody, a fraction of the 663 "special interest aliens" from 35 countries detained along the southwestern border for special U.S. scrutiny. None of the Iranians - indeed none of the 663 "special interest aliens" - has faced federal prosecution on terror-related charges, according to federal officials. No credible cases The number of Iranians apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "No credible terrorist threat has been identified, however DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the Southwest border and responds accordingly."